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Owen M. Fiss*
Adjudication is interpretation: Adjudication is the process by
which a judge comes to understand and express the meaning of an
authoritative legal text and the values embodied in that text.
Interpretation, whether it be in the law or literary domains, is
neither a wholly discretionary nor a wholly mechanical activity. It is
a dynamic interaction between reader and text, and meaning the
product of that interaction. It is an activity that affords a proper
recognition of both the subjective and objective dimensions of
human experience; and for that reason, has emerged in recent de-
cades as an attractive method for studying all social activity.' The
idea of a written text, the standard object of legal or literary interpre-
tation, has been expanded to embrace social action and situations,
which are sometimes called text-analogues. In one of the most signif-
icant works of this genre to date, Clifford Geertz's Negara, a nine-
teenth-century Balinese cremation ceremony is taken as "the text."'
2
Admittedly, to treat everything as a text might seem to trivialize
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the idea of a text, but the appeal of the interpretive analogy stems
from the fact that interpretation accords a proper place for both the
perspective of the scholar and the reality of the object being studied
and from the fact that interpretation sees the task of explicating
meaning as the most important and most basic intellectual endeavor.
This appeal is considerable and, as a consequence, liberties have been
taken with the notion of a text and interpretation is now accepted as
central to disciplines that were once on the verge of surrendering to
the so-called scientific ethos, such as politics and history (though in-
terestingly, not economics-there the surrender to the pretense of sci-
ence seems complete). The behaviorists or social scientists have
hardly quit the field, but a new humanistic strand has emerged and,
when pushed to define that strand, one would speak, above all, of
interpretation.
To recover, then, an old and familiar idea, namely, that adjudica-
tion is a form of interpretation, would build bridges between law and
the humanities and suggest a unity among man's many intellectual
endeavors. A proper regard for the distinctive social function of ad-
judication, and for the conditions that limit the legitimate exercise of
the judicial power, will require care in identifying the kinds of texts
to be construed and the rules that govern the interpretive process; the
judge is to read the legal text, not morality or public opinion, not, if
you will, the moral or social texts. But the essential unity between
law and the humanities would persist and the judge's vision would be
enlarged.
A recognition of the interpretive dimensions of adjudication and
the dynamic character of all interpretive activity and its capacity to
relate constructively the subjective and objective will also deepen our
understanding of law and in fact might even suggest how law is possi-
ble. It might enable us to come to terms with a new nihilism, one
that doubts the legitimacy of adjudication-a nihilism that appears
to me to be unwarranted and unsound, but that is gaining respecta-
bility and claiming an increasing number of important and respected
legal scholars, particularly in constitutional law. They have turned
their backs on adjudication and have begun a romance with politics.3
This new nihilism might acknowledge the characterization of ad-
judication as interpretation, but then would insist that the character-
3. See, e.g., Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Norma-
tioe Constitutional Scholarship , 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981); Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEx. L.
REV. (1982) (forthcoming); see also Walzer, Philosophy and Democraq, 9 POL. THEORY 379
(1981). Following the 1980 national elections and the overwhelming victory of the Right, the
affection for politics, which many thought belonged to elections, was conferred on the party
caucus. See, e.g., Walzer, Democraq vs. Elections, NEw REPUBLIC, Jan. 3 & 10, 1981, at 17.
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ization is a sham. The nihilist would argue that for any text-
particularly such a comprehensive text as the Constitution-there
are any number of possible meanings, that interpretation consists of
choosing one of those meanings, and that in this selection process the
judge will inevitably express his own values. All law is masked
power. In this regard the new nihilism is reminiscent of the legal
realism of the early twentieth century. It too sought to unmask what
was claimed to be the true nature of legal doctrine, particularly the
doctrine that insulated laissez faire capitalism from the growth of the
activist state and the reforms pressed by Progressives and the sup-
porters of the New Deal. It saw law as a projection of the judge's
values.
In the decades following the Second World War, particularly in
the sixties, at the height of the Warren Court era, a new judicial
doctrine arose'to replace the doctrine that was associated with laissez
faire capitalism and that was ultimately repudiated by the glorious
revolution of 1937 and the constitutional victory of the New Deal. It
embraced the role of the activist state and saw equality rather than
liberty as the central constitutional value. Scholars turned to defend-
ing this new doctrine and in so doing sought to rehabilitate the idea
of law in the face of the realist legacy.4 They sought to show that
Brown v. Board ofEducation5 was law, not just politics. So were Reynoldr
v. Sims,6 New York Times v. Sullivan,7 and Gideon v. Wainwright.8
The nihilism of today is largely a reaction to this reconstructive
effort of the sixties. It harks back to the realist movement of an ear-
lier era, and coincides with a number of contemporary phenomena-
the transfer of the judicial power from the Warren Court to another
institution altogether; a social and political culture dominated by the
privatization of all ends; and a new movement in literary criticism
and maybe even in philosophy called deconstructionism, which ex-
pands the idea of text to embrace all the world and at the same time
proclaims the freedom of the interpreter.9
4. See Ackerman, Book Review, DAEDALUS, Winter 1974, at 119 (reviewing J. FRANK,
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930)).
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
7. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
8. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
9. Set, e.g., H. BLOOM, P. DE MAN, J. DERmRDA, G. HARTMAN &J.H. MILLER, DECON-
STRUCTION AND CRricIsM (1979). For a spirited review of this book, revealing the many
strands within the deconstruction movement, see Donoghue, Deconsmlring Deconstruction (Book
Review), N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 12, 1980, at 37. For the more philosophic aspirations of
deconstructionism, see J. DERRIDA, OF GRAmmATOLOGY (G.C. Spivak trans. 1976).
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I.
The nihilism of which I speak fastens on the objective aspiration
of the law and sees this as a distinguishing feature of legal interpreta-
tion. The judge, the nihilist reminds us, seeks not just a plausible
interpretation, but an objectively true one. Judges may not project
their preferences or their views of what is right or wrong, or adopt
those of the parties, or of the body politic, but rather must say what
the Constitution requires. The issue is not whether school desegrega-
tion is good or bad, desirable or undesirable, to the judge, the parties,
or the public, but whether it is mandated by the Constitution. The
law aspires to objectivity, so the nihilist observes, but he concludes
that the nature of the constitutional text makes this impossible. The
text is capable of any number of possible meanings, and thus it is
impossible to speak of one interpretation as true and the other false.
It is impossible to speak of law with the objectivity required by the
idea of justice.
The nihilist stresses two features of the legal text in explaining
why objectivity is impossible. One is the use of general language.
The Constitution does not, for example, contain a specific directive
about the criteria for assigning students among the public schools,
but provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws." There is no further specifi-
cation of what is meant by "state," "person," "jurisdiction,"
"protection," "laws," or most importantly, "equal." The potential of
"equal" is staggering, and the nihilist is confounded by it. A second
feature of the text is its comprehensiveness. The Constitution is a
rich and varied text. It contains a multitude of values, some of which
potentially conflict with others. It promises equality and liberty. In
fact, at times it seems to contain almost every conceivable value, es-
pecially when one refers to such provisions as the privileges and im-
munities clause of article IV or the fourteenth amendment, or the
provision of the ninth amendment that reserves to the people rights
not otherwise enumerated in the Constitution.
In coming to terms with this nihilism, one must begin by ac-
knowledging the generality and comprehensiveness of the constitu-
tional text and also by insisting that in this regard the Constitution is
no different from a poem or any legal instrument. Generality and
comprehensiveness are features of any text. Though the Constitution
may be more general and comprehend more than a sonnet or a con-
tract, it is comparable in this regard to an epic poem or some na-
tional statutes. Few, if any, statutes touch as many activities as the
[Vol. 34:739
HeinOnline -- 34 Stan. L. Rev. 742 1981-1982
OBJECTIVITY AND INTERPRETA TION
Constitution itself (which, after all, establishes the machinery of gov-
ernment) but many, if not most, embody conflicting values and are
in that sense comprehensive. It should also be understood that gener-
ality and comprehensiveness do not discourage interpretation but are
the very qualities that usually provoke it. Interpretation is a process
of generating meaning, and one important (and very common) way
of both understanding and expressing the meaning of a text is to
render it specific and concrete.
There are some legal theorists who would limit legal interpreta-
tion to highly specific constitutional clauses. This school, mislead-
ingly called "interpretivism," but more properly called "textual
determinism," operates with a most arid and artificial conception of
interpretation.' For an interpretivist only a specific text can be in-
terpreted. Interpretation is thus confused with execution-the appli-
cation of a determinate meaning to a situation-and is
unproblematic only with regard to clauses like that requiring the
President to be at least 35 years old. Most interpretivists, including
Justice Black, would recognize the narrowness of such a perspective
and want to acknowledge a role for less specific clauses, like freedom
of speech; but in truth such provisions are hardly obvious in their
meaning and require substantial judicial interpretation to be given
their proper effect. Does "speech" embrace movies, flags, picketing,
and campaign expenditures? What is meant by "freedom"? Does it,
as Isaiah Berlin wondered, pertain exclusively to the absence of re-
straint, or does it also embrace an affirmative capacity for self-
realization? "
To endorse active judicial interpretation of specific clauses and to
caution against judicial interpretation of the more general and po-
tentially more far-reaching clauses, such as due process and equal
protection, represents an attempt at line-drawing that cannot itself
be textually justified. It is instead motivated by a desire-resting on
the most questionable of premises-to limit the role of constitutional
values in American government and the role of the judiciary in ex-
pressing those values. And the line itself would be illogical. It would
require that small effect be given to the comprehensive constitutional
protections while full effect is given to the narrow ones. I reject this
10. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMocRAcY AND DisTRusT. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980). Professor Grey also understands interpretation in this narrow fashion. See Grey, Od
gins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in Amrican Revolutionag, Thought, 30 STAN. L.
REv. 843 (1978); Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1975).
11. I. BERLIN, Two Concepts of Libety, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969).
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attempt at line-drawing because I reject the premises and the result,
but it must be emphasized that, for purposes of this essay, the critical
question is not whether judicial interpretation of specific clauses, un-
derstood in any realistic sense, is legitimate and that of general
clauses is not, since, as we saw in the case of the first amendment,
both require substantial interpretation. Rather the question is
whether any judicial interpretation can achieve the measure of objec-
tivity required by the idea of law.
Objectivity in the law connotes standards. It implies that an in-
terpretation can be measured against a set of norms that transcend
the particular vantage point of the person offering the interpretation.
Objectivity implies that the interpretation can be judged by some-
thing other than one's own notions of correctness. It imparts a notion
of impersonality. The idea of an objective interpretation does not
require that the interpretation be wholly determined by some source
external to the judge, but only that it be constrained. To explain the
source of constraint in the law, it is necessary to introduce two fur-
ther concepts: One is the idea of disciplining rules, which constrain
the interpreter and constitute the standards by which the correctness
of the interpretation is to be judged; the other is the idea of an inter-
pretive community, which recognizes these rules as authoritative.
The idea of objective interpretation accommodates the creative
role of the reader. It recognizes that the meaning of a text does not
reside in the text, as an object might reside in physical space or as an
element might be said to be present in a chemical compound, ready
to be extracted if only one knows the correct process; it recognizes a
role for the subjective. Indeed, interpretation is defined as the pro-
cess by which the meaning of a text is understood and expressed, and
the acts of understanding and expression necessarily entail strong
personal elements. At the same time, the freedom of the interpreter
is not absolute. The interpreter is not free to assign any meaning he
wishes to the text. He is disciplined by a set of rules that specify the
relevance and weight to be assigned to the material (e.g., words, his-
tory, intention, consequence), as well as by those that define basic
concepts and that established the procedural circumstances under
which the interpretation must occur.
The disciplining rules may vary from text to text. The rules for
the interpretation of a poem differ from those governing the interpre-
tation of legal material; and even within the law, there may be differ-
ent rules depending on the text-those for contractual interpretation
vary from statutory interpretation, and both vary from those used in
[Vol. 34:739
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constitutional interpretation. Though the particular content of disci-
plining rules varies, their function is the same. They constrain the
interpreter, thus transforming the interpretive process from a subjec-
tive to an objective one, and they furnish the standards by which the
correctness of the interpretation can be judged. These rules are not
simply standards or principles held by individual judges, but instead
constitute the institution (the profession) in which judges find them-
selves and through which they act. The disciplining rules operate
similarly to the rules of language, which constrain the users of the
language, furnish the standards for judging the uses of language, and
constitute the language. The disciplining rules of the law may be
understood, as my colleague Bruce Ackerman has suggested, as a pro-
fessional grammar.
Rules are not rules unless they are authoritative, and that author-
ity can only be conferred by a community. Accordingly, the disci-
plining rules that govern an interpretive activity must be seen as
defining or demarcating an interpretive community consisting of
those who recognize the rules as authoritative. This means, above all
else, that the objective quality of interpretation is bounded, limited,
or relative.12 It is bounded by the existence of a community that
recognizes and adheres to the disciplining rules used by the inter-
preter and that is defined by its recognition of those rules. The objec-
tivity of the physical world may be more transcendent, less
relativistic, though the Kuhnian tradition in the philosophy of sci-
ence throws considerable doubt on that commonsense understand-
ing;13 but as revealed by the reference to language, and the analogy I
have drawn between the rules of language and the disciplining rules
of interpretation, the physical does not exhaust the claim of objectiv-
ity, nor does it make this bounded objectivity of interpretation a sec-
ondary or parasitic kind of objectivity. Bounded objectivity is the
only kind of objectivity to which the law-or any interpretive activ-
ity--ever aspires and the only one about which we care. 4 To insist
12. The bounded or relativistic quality of the interpretive method is suggested by the
idea of the hermeneutic circle, which denotes the parameters within which an interpretation
achieves its validity and is based on the assumption that, at some point, an interpretation.
must make an intuitive appeal to common understandings. The idea of the hermeneutic
circle is discussed in Taylor, Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, supra note 1, at 6-13, and
vividly described by Geertz, NEGARA, supra note 2, at 103, as "a dialectical tacking." David
Hoy draws a parallel between the idea of the hermeneutic circle and John Rawls' notion of
reflective equilibrium. See Hoy, Hermeneutics, 47 Soc. RESEARCH 649, 666 (1980).
13. Se T. KUHN, THE ESSENTIAL TENSION (1977); T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed., enlarged 1970).
14. Taylor, Understanding in Human Sience, supra note 1, at 33-37.
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on more, to search for the brooding omnipresence in the sky,1 5 is to
create a false issue.
Nihilism is also fashionable in literary criticism today and is rep-
resented there by what I referred to as the deconstruction move-
ment.1 6  Deconstructionists exalt the creative and subjective
dimension of interpretation. For them, interpretive freedom is abso-
lute. Deconstructionists reject the idea of objectivity in interpreta-
tion, presumably even the bounded objectivity of which I speak,
because they would deny that an interpretive community possesses
the necessary authority to confer on the rules that might constrain
the interpreter and constitute the standards of evaluation. Compet-
ing interpretive communities, and the freedom of the literary critics
to leave one community and to join or establish another, are consid-
ered by the deconstructionists as inconsistent with the authoritative-
ness that rules need in order to constrain. Authority that depends
completely on members' agreement is not authority at all.
I will not here attempt to dispute the notion that literary critics
are so unconstrained that no claim of objectivity can be made for any
of their interpretations, though my instinct is to be wary of this form
of nihilism too."7 For my purposes, it is sufficient to recognize the
distinctive feature of legal interpretation: In law the interpretive
community is a reality. It has authority to confer because member-
ship does not depend on agreement. Judges do not belong to an in-
terpretive community as a result of shared views about particular
issues or interpretations, but belong by virtue of a commitment to
uphold and advance the rule of law itself. They belong by virtue of
their office. There can be many schools of literary interpretation, but
as Jordan Flyer put it, in legal interpretation there is only one school
and attendance is mandatory. All judges define themselves as mem-
15. The phrase belongs to Justice Holmes, Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205,
222 (1916) (dissenting opinion) ("The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky,
but the articulate voice of some sovereign .... "), and is often used to mock the idea of
objectivity.
16. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
17. See S. FISH, Is THERE A TExT IN THIS CLASS? (.1980). Professor Fish acknowledges
the creative relationship between reader and text, but sees the reader as a member of an
interpretive community whose institutions shape or structure his view of the world. He ar-
gues that those who happen to share the same values and thus belong to the same interpretive
community can judge the correctness of an interpretation, though the standards may change
as the community does. The question for literature, however, is whether the interpretive
community possesses the necessary authority to confer on what I have called the disciplining
rules. For an illuminating review of this important book, see Graff, Culture andAnarch, (Book
Review), NEW R.PUBLiC, Feb. 14, 1981, at 36.
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bers of this school and must do so in order to exercise the prerogatives
of their office. Even if their personal commitment to the rule of law
wavers, the rule continues to act on judges; even if the rule of law
fails to persuade, it can coerce. Judges know that if they relinquish
their membership in the interpretive community, or deny its author-
ity, they lose their right to speak with the authority of the law.
Nothing I have said denies the possibility of disagreement in legal
interpretation. Some disputes may be centered on the correct appli-
cation of a rule of discipline. For example, a dispute may arise over a
rule that requires the interpreter to look to history. Some may claim
that the judge has misunderstood the history of the fourteenth
amendment or that he is using a level of generality that is inappro-
priate for constitutional interpretation."8 They may claim, for exam-
ple, that the focus should not be on the existence of segregated
schools in 1868 or on the willingness of those who drafted and
adopted the fourteenth amendment to tolerate segregated schools,
but on the framers' desire to eradicate the caste system and the impli-
cation of that desire for segregated education today. Disputes of this
kind are commonplace, but they pose little threat to the legitimacy of
the disciplining rules; they pose only issues of application.
Other disputes may arise, however, and they may involve a chal-
lenge to the very authority or existence of a rule. Some judges or
lawyers may, for example, deny the relevance of history altogether in
constitutional interpretation. 9 Disputes of this type pose a more seri-
ous challenge to the idea of objectivity than those over the applica-
tion of a rule, for such disputes threaten the source of constraint
itself. It should be remembered, however, that in the law there are
procedures for resolving these disputes-for example, pronounce-
ments by the highest court and perhaps even legislation and constitu-
tional amendments. The presence of such procedures and a
hierarchy of authority for resolving disputes that could potentially
divide or destroy an interpretive community is one of the distinctive
features of legal interpretation. One should also be careful not to
exaggerate the impact of such disputes. The authority of a particular
rule can be maintained even when it is disputed, provided the disa-
greement is not too pervasive; the integrity of an interpretive com-
munity can be preserved even in the face of a dispute or
18. Gunther, Too Much a Battle With Straw Men? (Book Review), Wall St. J., Nov. 25,
1977, at 4, col. 4 (reviewing R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977)).
19. Seegenrall Brest, The Misconceived Q=estfor the Orginal Understandng, 60 B.U.L. REV.
204 (1980).
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disagreement as to the authority of some particular disciplining rule.
The legal community transcends cliques; some cliques may dissolve
over time, others may come to dominate the community.
Just as objectivity is compatible with a measure of disagreement,
it should also be stressed that objectivity is compatible with error:
An objective interpretation is not necessarily a correct one. Brown v.
Board of Education and Plessy v. Ferguson,2 one condemning segrega-
tion, the other approving it, may both be objective and thus legiti-
mate exercises of the judicial power, though only one is correct. To
understand how this is possible, we must first recognize that legal
interpretations can be evaluated from two perspectives, one internal,
the other external.
From the internal perspective, the standards of evaluation are the
disciplining rules themselves, and the authority of the interpretive
community is fully acknowledged. The criticism, say, of Plessy v. Fer-
guson might be that the judges did not correctly understand the au-
thoritative rules, or may have misapplied them; the judges may have
failed to grasp the constitutional ideal of equality imported into the
Constitution by the fourteenth amendment, or incorrectly assumed
that the affront to blacks entailed in the Jim Crow system was self-
imposed. Though such a criticism argues that the interpretation is
mistaken, it might well acknowledge the objective character of the
interpretation on the theory, borrowed from Wittgenstein, 21 that mis-
understanding is a form of understanding, that a judge could misun-
derstand or misapply a rule and still be constrained by it. An
objective but (legally) incorrect interpretation partakes of the imper-
sonality or sense of constraint implied by the idea of law. Not every
mistake in adjudication is an example of lawlessness.
The internal perspective permits another type of criticism in
which both the objectivity and the correctness of the decision may be
challenged. The charge may be that the judge utterly disregarded
well-recognized disciplining rules, such as those requiring the judge
to take account of the intention of the framers of the fourteenth
amendment or those rules prohibiting the judge from being influ-
enced by personal animosities or bias. If these are the bases of criti-
cism of the judicial decision, and arguably they may have some
relevance to Plessy, then the claim is that the interpretation is both
wrong and non-objective. I imagine that it is also possible for an
20. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
21. L. WrrrGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY §§ 74, 156 (G. Anscombe & G. von Wright, eds.;
D. Paul & G. Anscombe trans. 1969).
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interpretation to be both non-objective and correct, as when a judge
pretty much decides to do what he wishes, that is, once again utterly
disregards the disciplining rules, and yet in this instance gives the
text the same meaning-in a substantive sense-as would a fair and
conscientious judge constrained by all the appropriate rules. Such a
situation does not seem to be of great practical importance, but it
once again illustrates the analytic distinction between objectivity and
correctness, even from the wholly internal perspective. Both qualities
arise from the very same rules: Objectivity speaks to the constraining
force of the rules and whether the act of judging is constrained; cor-
rectness speaks to the content of the rules and whether the process of
adjudication and the meaning produced by that process are fully in
accord with that content. From the internal perspective, legitimacy
largely turns on objectivity rather than correctness; judges are al-
lowed to make some mistakes.
The internal perspective does not exhaust all evaluation of legal
interpretation. Someone who stands outside of the interpretive com-
munity and thus disputes the authority of that community and its
rules may provide another viewpoint. A criticism from this so-called
external perspective might protest Plessy on the basis of some reli-
gious or ethical principle (e.g., denying the relevance of any racial
distinction) or on the grounds of some theory of politics (e.g., con-
demning the decision because it will cause social unrest). In that in-
stance, the evaluation is not in terms of the law; it matters not at all
whether the decision is objective. It may be law, even good law, but
it is wrong, whether morally, politically, or from a religious point of
view.
The external critic may accept the pluralism implied by the ad-
jectives "legal," "moral," "political," and "religious," each denoting
different standards of judgment or different spheres of human activ-
ity. The external critic may be able to order his life in a way that
acknowledges the validity of the legal judgment and that at the same
time preserves the integrity of his view, based on non-legal standards,
about the correctness of the decision. He may render unto the law
that which is the law's. Conflict is not a necessity, but it does occur,
as it did over the extension of slavery in the 1850s and over the legali-
zation of abortion in the 1970s. The external critic will then have to
establish priorities. He may move to amend the Constitution or en-
gage in any number of lesser and more problematic strategies
designed to alter the legal standards, such as packing the court or
enacting statutes that curtail jurisdiction. Failing that, he remains
April 1982]
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free to insist that the moral, religious, or political principle take pre-
cedence over the legal. He can disobey.
One of the remarkable features of the American legal system is
that it permits such a broad range of responses to the external critic,
and that over time-maybe in some instances over too much time-
the legal system responds to this criticism. The law evolves. There is
progress in the law. An equally remarkable feature of the American
system is that the freedom of the external critic to deny the law, and
to insist that his moral, religious, or political views take precedence
over the legal interpretation, is a freedom that is not easily exercised.
Endogenous change is always preferred, even in the realm of the
wholly intellectual. The external critic struggles to work within the
law, say, through amendments, appointments, or inducing the
Supreme Court to recognize that it had made a mistake. An exercise
of the freedom to deny the law, and to insist that his moral, religious,
or political views take precedence, requires the critic to dispute the
authority of the Constitution and the community that it defines, and
that is a task not lightly engaged. The authority of the law is
bounded, true, but as de Tocqueville recognized more than a century
ago, in America those bounds are almost without limits.22 The com-
mitment to the rule of law is nearly universal.
II.
Viewing adjudication as interpretation helps to stop the slide to-
ward nihilism. It makes law possible. We can find in this conceptu-
alization a recognition of both the subjective and the objective-the
important personal role played by the interpreter in the meaning-
giving process, and yet the possibility of an inter-subjective meaning
rooted in the idea of disciplining rules and of an interpretive commu-
nity that both legitimates those rules and is defined by them. I have
explained how objective interpretation becomes possible in the law,
even if it is not possible in literature. But a number of other distin-
guishing features of adjudication remain to be considered: the pre-
scriptive nature of the text, the claim of authoritativeness for the
interpretation, and the desire for efficacy. These differences seem to
deny the essential unity between the ways of the law and those of the
humanities and may well cast doubt on my claim about the existence
of constraint in the law. The question is whether we can insist that
22. 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMoCAcY IN AMERIcA 123-32 (London 1838).
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adjudication is an interpretive activity and still find that it possesses
an objective character in the face of these differences. I think we can.
A. The Prescriptive Nature of the Text
Legal texts are prescriptive. Though they presuppose a state of
the world, and employ terms and concepts that are descriptive or
representational, their purpose is not to describe, but to prescribe.
For example, the statement in the fourteenth amendment that "[n]o
State shall . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws" is not meant to depict what is happening,
much less what has happened, but to prescribe what should happen.
It embodies a value--equality-and I see adjudication as the process
by which that value, among others, is given concrete meaning and
expression.
Adjudication and morality both aspire to prescribe norms of
proper conduct. Both state the ideal. The ultimate authority for
morality is some conception of the good. The ultimate authority for
a judicial decree is the Constitution, for that text embodies public
values and establishes the institutions through which those values are
to be understood and expressed. When asked to justify why the
schools of a community must be desegregated, reference will first be
made to some lower court decision, then to a Supreme Court deci-
sion, and finally to the Constitution itself, for it is the source of both
the value of equality and the authority of the judiciary to interpret
that value.
The prescriptive element in adjudication and legal texts does not
preclude objective interpretation. Prescriptive texts are as amenable
to interpretation as descriptive ones. Those who might think other-
wise would point to the profound and pervasive disagreement that
often characterizes moral life-that people disagree about what is
right and good, as, for example, whether the separate-but-equal doc-
trine is consistent with equality or whether the state should be al-
lowed to interfere with the freedom of a woman to decide to have an
abortion. The existence of this disagreement cannot be denied, but I
fail to see why it precludes interpretation or is inconsistent with
objectivity.
Interpretation does not require agreement or consensus, nor does
the objective character of legal interpretation arise from agreement.
What is being interpreted is a text, and the morality embodied in
that text, not what individual people believe to be the good or right.
An individual is, as I have already noted, morally free to dispute the
claim of the public morality embodied in the Constitution and its
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interpretation-he can become a renegade-but that possibility does
not deny the existence or validity of either that morality or its inter-
pretation. Neither the objectivity nor the correctness of Brown v.
Board ofEducation depends on the unanimity of the justices, and much
less on the willingness of the people-all the people, or most of the
people-then or even now-to agree with that decision. The test is
whether that decision is in accord with the authoritative disciplining
rules. Short of a disagreement that denies the authority of the inter-
pretive community and the force of the disciplining rules, agreement
is irrelevant in determining whether a judge's decision is a proper
interpretation of the law.
Moreover, though the celebration of disagreement in the realm of
morality has become commonplace, it is far from clear that disagree-
ment is more pervasive in the interpretation of prescriptive texts than
descriptive or representational ones: Consensus as to the meaning of
a play by Shakespeare, a novel by Joyce, or a historical text by Thu-
cydides seems no more likely than it does in the interpretation of the
Constitution. Consensus becomes possible in the interpretation of
descriptive or representational texts only if we trivialize those texts
(e.g., reduce them to statements like "There is a tree in my back
yard."). That move is equally available in the treatment of prescrip-
tive texts (e.g., "Equality is good."), though I see no value in insisting
upon it.
The prescriptive nature of the text therefore should not be seen as
a bar to objective interpretation, but it does have an important im-
pact on the content of the disciplining rules, that is, the rules through
which the law is defined. Legal interpreters are under constant pres-
sure to abide by the constraints that govern moral judgments, for
both law and morals seek to establish norms of proper behavior and
attempt to describe the ideal by similar concepts, such as liberty and
equality. Law borrows from morals (and, of course, morals from
law). The borrowing is sometimes substantive; more often it is
procedural.
Different schools of interpretation contemplate different degrees
of borrowing. The natural law tradition, for example, demands that
the judge give morality the decisive role in the interpretation of the
legal text, or to put the same point somewhat differently, that the
judge read the legal text in light of the moral text, the so-called "un-
written constitution. ' 23 In this instance the substantive borrowing
23. This tradition is explored in the articles of Professor Grey, referred to in note 10
[Vol. 34:739
HeinOnline -- 34 Stan. L. Rev. 752 1981-1982
April 1982] OBJECTIVITY AND INTERPRETATION
would be most pronounced, but in fact the natural law tradition has
never dominated American jurisprudence. That school has re-
mained a clique. It has been largely overshadowed by legal positiv-
ism, which emphasizes the analytical distinction between law and
morals, between what is legal and what is good. Legal positivism
celebrates the "written constitution" and stresses factors like the use
of particular words or the intent or beliefs of the framers, all of which
have little or no moral relevance.
Positivism tries to separate law from morals, and keeps the sub-
stantive borrowing to a minimum, but as I suggested in my account
of the so-called external criticism, and my depiction of the pressures
forcing the external critic to work within the law, the separation will,
in fact, never be complete. Two forces modulate the commitment to
positivism and thus minimize the separation. The first derives from
the fact that the judge is trying to give meaning and expression to
public values (those that are embodied in a legal text) and that his
understanding of such values-equality, liberty, property, due pro-
cess, cruel and unusual punishment-is necessarily shaped by the
prevailing morality. The moral text is a prism through which he un-
derstands the legal text. The second force relates to an intellectual
dilemma of positivism: A too rigid insistence on positivism will inevi-
tably bring into question the ultimate moral authority of the legal
text-the justness of the Constitution.
Judges ardently committed to legal positivism will ultimately be
asked-as they were in the debates over the constitutionality of slav-
ery before the Civil War24 and in response to the judicial efforts to
protect industrial capitalism in the early part of the twentieth cen-
tury2 5 -to justify the public morality embodied in that text and the
processes by which those values are expressed. Slavery may be pro-
tected by the Constitution; so may industrial capitalism and the ine-
quality of wealth and privilege it invariably produces; but why must
we respect the Constitution? The answer to such a question is not
obvious or easily discovered, for one must transcend the text and the
rules of interpretation to justify the authority of the text; to justify
the Constitution itself or explain why the Constitution should be
obeyed, one must move beyond law to political theory, if not religion.
supra, and also in R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
(1975).
24. See THE CONSTITUTION A PRO-SLAVERY COMPACT (W. Phillips ed. 2d ed., en-
larged 1845) (W. Phillips ed. 1st ed. 1844) (The Anti-Slavery Examiner No. 11).
25. & C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1913).
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Such questioning can itself become a moment of crisis in the life of a
constitution, and since it is occasioned by a rigid insistence on the
principles of positivism and the separation of law and morals, judges
have an incentive to temper their commitment to that legal theory
and thus to read the moral as well as the legal text. A judge quickly
learns to read in a way that avoids crises.
An even more pronounced measure of borrowing occurs in for-
mulating the disciplining rules that govern the procedures of legal
interpretation. Above all, it is the procedures of morals that the law
borrows.26 One vision of the procedures of morals is conveyed by the
vivid and powerful image created by John Rawls of the original posi-
tion-of a group of people deliberating behind a veil of ignorance
and reaching agreement on the principles of justice in a situation
that entails divorcement from interests, a willingness to engage in
rational dialogue, and a willingness to universalize the principles
agreed upon. 7 Rawls was speaking of morals, but we can see in the
law an insistence on an analogous set of procedural norms to disci-
pline the interpreter: The judge must stand independent of the inter-
ests of the parties or even those of the body politic (the requirement
of judicial independence); the judge must listen to grievances he
might otherwise prefer not to hear (the concept of a nondiscretionary
jurisdiction) and must listen to all who will be directly affected by his
decision (the rules respecting parties); the judge must respond and
assume personal responsibility for that decision (the tradition of the
signed opinion); and the judge must justify his decision in terms that
are universalizable (the neutral principles requirement). These rules
reflect the inherently prescriptive character of the legal text and the
identity of concepts used by law and morals to describe the ideal.
These procedural constraints are not, mind you, mere techniques
of administration, to be dispensed with whenever the need or desire
to do so arises. They are an essential component of the body of disci-
plining rules that govern the interpretive process known as adjudica-
tion and that constitute the standards for evaluating a legal
interpretation. The correctness of any interpretation is relative to a
set of standards, and in law those standards are composed of proce-
26. This is the essential insight of Professor Lon Fuller and his attempt to reformulate
the natural law tradition in procedural terms. Se L FULLER, THE MORALrrY OF LAW (rev.
ed. 1969).
27. J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). A similar vision is found in Thomas
Nagel's image of the individual struggling to stand outside himself and the world, as a way of
achieving an objective perspective. See T. NAGEL, Subjctive and Objective, in MORTAL QuEs-
TIONS 196 (1979).
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dural as well as sibstantive norms. This is partly due to the prescrip-
tive nature of the text and the fact that the judge is trying to state the
ideal, which has the effect of blending the idea of "correctness" into
'justness": A just interpretation speaks to process as well as outcome.
The role of procedure is also attributable, though perhaps in a secon-
dary way, to certain institutional facts. The judiciary is a coordinate
agency of government, always competing, at least intellectually, with
other agencies for the right to establish the governing norms of the
polity. The judiciary's claim is largely founded on its special compe-
tence to interpret a text such as the Constitution, and to render spe-
cific and concrete the public morality embodied in that text; that
competence stems not from the personal qualities of those who are
judges--judges are not assumed to have the wisdom of philosopher-
kings-but rather from the procedures that limit the exercise of their
power. It is as though they operate under the procedural constraints
of the original position and from that fact obtain a measure of au-
thority over the other branches.
B. The Claim of Authoritativeness
I have pictured the judge as an individual essentially engaged in
interpretive activity. I have also suggested a moral dimension to le-
gal interpretation-the judge interprets a prescriptive text and in so
doing gives meaning and expression to the values embodied in that
text. The judge seems to be a combination of literary critic and
moral philosopher. But that is only part of the picture. The judge
also speaks with the authority of the Pope.
Some literary critics aspire to a kind of authority: They search
not just for a plausible interpretation, but for the correct interpreta-
tion of a text. The same is true for moral philosophers: They do not
simply express what they believe to be good, but try to identify prin-
ciples of morality that are objective and true. Both the literary critic
and the moral philosopher aspire to a kind of authority we might
term intellectual, an authority that comes from being right in their
intellectual endeavor. Judges also attempt to achieve intellectual au-
thority, yet this is only to supplement a powerful base of authority
that they otherwise possess. Judicial interpretations are binding,
whether or not they are correct. The decision of Brown v. Board of
Education was not only right but had the force of law; Plesy v. Fergu-
son may have been wrong, from either the internal or external per-
spective, in 1896, as well as now, but it was nonetheless binding.
In what ways is the interpretation of the judge uniquely authori-
CIpril 19821
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tative? There are two answers to this question. The first, empha-
sized in the work of John Austin,28 is based on power: By virtue of
the rules that govern their behavior, the officers of the state are enti-
tled to use the power at their disposal to bring about compliance
with judicial interpretations. Sometimes the power is brought to
bear on the individual through contempt proceedings; sometimes
through criminal prosecutions and police action; sometimes through
supplemental civil proceedings. Sometimes, as with the desegrega-
tion of the public schools at Little Rock or the admission of James
Meredith at Ole Miss, the power is expressed through brute force-
bayonets, rifles, clubs, and tear gas.29 A judicial interpretation is au-
thoritative in the sense that it legitimates the use of force against
those who refuse to accept or otherwise give effect to the meaning
embodied in that interpretation.
The second sense of authoritativeness, suggested by the works of
other positivists, namely Herbert Hart30 and Hans Kelsen,31 stresses
not the use of state power, but an ethical claim to obedience-a
claim that an individual has a moral duty to obey a judicial interpre-
tation, not because of its particular intellectual authority (i.e., be-
cause it is a correct interpretation), but because the judge is part of
an authority structure that is good to preserve. This version of the
claim of authoritativeness speaks to the individual's conscience and
derives from institutional virtue, rather than institutional power. It
is the most important version of the claim of authoritativeness, be-
cause no society can heavily depend on force to secure compliance; it
is also the most tenuous one. It vitally depends on a recognition of
the value ofjudicial interpretation. Denying the worth of the Consti-
tution, the place of constitutional values in the American system, or
the judiciary's capacity to interpret the Constitution dissolves this
particular claim to authoritativeness.
Belief in the institutional virtue of judicial interpretation may
proceed from a variety of theories. One theory stresses the impor-
tance of having questions of public values settled with some finality
through procedures unique to the judiciary. Another centers on the
desirability of maintaining continuity with our traditional values and
28. J. AusTiN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (London 1832); see
also Holmes, The Path ofthe Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457 (1897).
29. See generaly BAYONETS IN THE STREETS (R. Higham ed. 1969). The history of the
efforts to desegregate the University of Mississippi is also detailed in United States v. Barnett,
330 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1963).
30. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
31. H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (1945).
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sees adjudication as the process best designed to promote that end. A
third theory emphasizes the need to maintain the stability of the
larger political system and the role of the judiciary in maintaining
that stability. Taken together, or maybe even separately, these theo-
ries have sufficient force, at least to my mind, to create a presumption
in favor of the authoritativeness ofjudicial decisions. Any interpreta-
tion of a court, certainly that of the highest court, is prima facie au-
thoritative. On the other hand, none of these theories, taken
individually or collectively, can assure that this presumption will
withstand a decision that many, operating from either the internal or
external perspective, perceive to be fundamentally mistaken, an egre-
gious error. In such a situation, the judge may be unable to ground
his claim to obedience on a theory of virtue, but may have to assert
the authoritativeness that proceeds from institutional power alone.
It is important to note that the claim of authoritativeness,
whether it be predicated on virtue or power, is extrinsic to the process
of interpretation. It does not arise from the act of interpretation itself
and is sufficient to distinguish the judge from the literary critic or
moral philosopher who must rely on intellectual authority alone.
Moreover, though the claim of institutional authoritativeness is not
logically inconsistent with objective interpretation, but rather pre-
supposes it, the authoritative quality of legal interpretation in-
troduces certain tensions into the interpretive process. It creates a
strong critical environment; it provides unusually strong incentives to
criticize and defend the correctness of the interpretation. Something
practical and important turns on judicial interpretations. They are
binding. Institutional authoritativeness also produces psychological
strains in the interpreter. It at once oppresses and liberates the
interpreter.
From one perspective, the claim of authoritativeness acts as a
weight: It creates additional responsibility. The search for meaning
is always arduous, but even more so when one realizes that the inter-
pretation will become authoritative. Brown must have been agoniz-
ing. The justices had to determine what the ideal of racial equality
meant and structure its relation to liberty. This task was hard
enough, especially given the legacy of Plesjy v. Frgwuon, but the diffi-
culty was compounded because the justices knew they were also es-
tablishing the course of the nation. They were authoritatively
deciding whether more than one-third of the states could adhere to
their long-established and passionately defended social order. Au-
thoritativeness confers a responsibility that is awesome, probably at
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times disabling. It appears that in at least one instance, when Justice
Whittaker had to decide the reapportionment issue in Baker v. Carr, 2
this responsibility produced a nervous breakdown. 3
The contrasting perspective is best captured by the work of Jus-
tice Douglas and a judicial quip that became popular in the mid-
1960s, at the height of the Warren Court era: "With five votes we
can do anything." From this perspective, the claim of authoritative-
ness liberates the judge, dangerously so; he works with the knowledge
that his words will bind whether or not he has correctly interpreted
the text. This sense of security is not completely well-founded, for, as
we saw, insofar as the judge claims authoritativeness based on the
virtue of the institution, the claim can be overcome or defeated by
what others perceive to be a particularly serious mistake. Even from
the perspective of power, the judge must recognize that a serious
abuse of the judicial office may also incline the executive against us-
ing the force at its disposal to compel obedience. (Eisenhower's hesi-
tation in deploying the federal troops in Little Rock is ample
warning on that score.) But these limitations on the claim of authori-
tativeness depend on a complicated chain of reasoning and presup-
pose the most egregious of errors, and as such, only circumscribe the
judge's sense of freedom. The larger fact is the freedom itself: An
interpretation is binding even if mistaken. The judge enjoys a pro-
tection that is not shared by the literary critic or the moral philoso-
pher, and that might allow a casual indifference to the integrity of
the interpretive enterprise. The impact of the disciplining rules may
be dulled. The search for meaning may be less than complete.
The mention of Justice Whittaker and Justice Douglas is not
meant to suggest that each dimension of this conflicting dynamic
finds expression in a different person. I assume that the psychologi-
cal conflict resulting from the claim of authoritativeness is present in
all judges, perhaps all the time. The existence of this conflict does
not deny the interpretive character of judging, or make that task im-
possible to perform. The great judge-I have Earl Warren very
much in mind-is someone who can modulate these tensions, some-
one whom the spectre of authority both disciplines and liberates,
someone who can transcend the conflict.
32. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
33. This is part of the folklore of the Supreme Court and thus found its way into B.
WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 176 (1979).
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C. Eftia y and the Element of nstrumentalism
The claim of authoritativeness, like the prescriptive nature of the
text, complicates and defines the distinctive nature of legal interpre-
tation. There is a third dimension that informs the task of the judge
and that probably plays an even greater role in giving legal interpre-
tation its distinctive cast: The judge tries to be efficacious. The
judge seeks to interpret the legal text and then to transform social
reality so that it comports with that interpretation.
The literary critic, no doubt, often finds himself anxious whether
his audience will accept his interpretation as the true one, and he will
polish his rhetorical skills and participate in institutional politics to
that end. But the personal anxieties of the literary critic are raised to
a duty in the law. The judge must give a remedy; it is part of the
definition of his office. The duty of the Supreme Court in Brown was
to interpret the ideal of racial equality in terms of concrete reality
and to initiate a process that would transform that reality so that it
comports with the ideal-to transform, as the slogan reads, the dual
school systems into unitary, nonracial ones.
The authoritativeness of a legal interpretation is an essential in-
gredient of this transformational process. Faced with the Little Rock
crisis, the Supreme Court felt compelled to reaffirm Brown and to put
its authority on the line. But the reassertion of the authority of its
interpretation, the achievement of Cooper v. Aaron,34 did not itself de-
segregate the schools. Authoritativeness is a necessary, not a suffi-
cient, condition of efficacy. Efficacy also requires measures that will
transform social reality.
Part of that transformational process entails further specification
of the meaning of the text, an explication of the ideal of racial equal-
ity in the context of a particular social setting: Does the commitment
to racial equality allow freedom of choice as the method of student
assignment in this particular city? Does it allow a neighborhood
school plan? The answers to these questions depend in part on a
specification of the imperatives of the ideal of racial equality and its
relation to other constitutional ideals, such as liberty. In this regard,
the transformational process also entails interpretation, with, so to
speak, one eye on the Constitution and the other on the world-the
world that was and the one that should be. But there is another
dimension of the transformational process that is not properly consid-
34. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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ered interpretive: instrumentalism. The judge must know how to
achieve specific objectives in the real world.
The meaning the court gives the constitutional value, in the gen-
eral and in the specific, defines and structures the end to be achieved
by this transformational process. The objective established in Brown
is to desegregate the schools. The question then becomes one of de-
ciding how to achieve this objective, and in resolving that question
the judge will have to make certain technical judgments: choosing
the schools to be paired, designing bus routes, deciding which teach-
ers are to be reassigned, adjusting the curriculum and sports sched-
ule, etc. He may rely on the initiative of the parties and their so-
called experts to help in these matters, but in the end, he will have to
assume responsibility for the technical judgments-the judge must be
an architect and engineer, redesigning and rebuilding social
structures.
This is, however, only one facet of the instrumentalism. We also
know, especially from the history of Brown, that a deeper and more
intractable set of obstacles may confront the judge in his effort to give
the value of racial equality a practical meaning: resistance by those
who must cooperate in order for the meaning to become a reality-
parents, children, teachers, administrators, citizens, and politicians.
Collectively, and sometimes even individually, these people have the
power to frustrate the remedial process. In ways that are both subtle
and crude, they may refuse to recognize the authoritativeness of the
judge's interpretation. They can boycott the schools, attack the mi-
nority students, withdraw from the public school system and flee to
the suburbs or private schools, or refuse to appropriate money
needed for buses.
In the face of this resistance, the judge can reassert his authority
either by proclaiming the virtues of his office and the place of the
judiciary in the political system, or by employing the power at his
disposal. When the resistance is deep and sufficiently widespread,
however, such an action is likely to be hollow and unavailing. Then
the judge must be able to manage his opposition: He must transform
resistance into cooperation. He must win the support of those he
needs. He must bargain and negotiate. To succeed in achieving his
remedial objectives, the judge must be as much a political strategist
as he is a social architect and engineer.
This journey into instrumentalism, perhaps most vividly symbol-
ized by the "all deliberate speed" formula of the second Brown deci-
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sion,3 5 may cause important departures from the interpretive
paradigm, for the legal text cannot inform, in any important sense,
"the technical and strategic judgments that are an integral part of the
remedial process. The Constitution establishes the values and estab-
lishes the institutions for expressing those values, but is not a signifi-
cant source for understanding how those values might be effectively
implemented. It is not a manual of the type Machiavelli might
write. The judge can, of course, read another text, such as the one
read by legislators-public opinion-but it is not an authoritative
text for the judge. Moreover, there is no reason to assume that in-
strumental judgements should be or even could be constrained by the
disciplining rules that characteristically govern judicial interpreta-
tion-for example, the rules assigning weight to precedent or requir-
ing dialogue or independence of the judiciary from the political
process. Indeed, it is not at all clear why the instrumental judgments
are entrusted to the same officials who are charged with interpreting
the constitutional text. At best, one can employ an argument of ne-
cessity-the instrumental judgments must be entrusted to the judge
as a way of preserving the integrity of the meaning-giving enterprise,
because the meaning of a value derives from its practical realization
as well as its intellectual articulation.
The concern with efficacy may have even greater consequences.
Instrumentalism may not only call for a departure from the interpre-
tive paradigm, it may actually interfere with the interpretive process.
It may make the judge settle for something less than what he per-
ceives to be the correct interpretation. The technical and strategic
obstacles to efficacy may humble the judge and remind him that
even with five votes he cannot do everything, for they reveal the
practical limits of his authority; but there is always the risk that the
humility will be excessive. It may be crippling. Fearing he lacks the
ability-the technical expertise or political power-to implement the
right answer, and determined to avoid failure, even if it means doing
nothing, the judge may tailor both the remedy and the right to what
he perceives to be possible, and that may be considerably less than
what he believes the text-the appropriate text-requires. That fear
may drive the judge to read a lesser text-public opinion-or even
worse, it might lead the judge to embrace what might be regarded as
Frankfurter's axiom-it is better to succeed in doing nothing than to
fail in doing something. Doubting that he has the ability to change
35. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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social mores36 or to implement desegregation plans that involve the
suburbs as well as the city,3 7 the judge may so modify his reading of
the equal protection clause as to produce an interpretation of equal-
ity that tolerates separation.
The desire for efficacy may, as a result of this dynamic, corrupt,
but it need not. The need to address complex social situations with
creative and often complicated remedies and then to manipulate
power so as to make them reality is undeniable, but these needs do
not necessarily cause the judge to compromise the integrity of his
interpretation. A secure concept of the judicial role, and the priori-
ties within that role, and a proper recognition of the source of legiti-
macy, may enable the judge to order and perhaps even reconcile
tasks that may otherwise tend to conflict. The core of adjudication,
objective interpretation, can be protected from the pressures of in-
strumentalism, as it can be protected from the tensions produced by
the claim of authoritativeness. The multiple demands of adjudica-
tion often make law an elusive, partly realized ideal, for they mean
the judge must manage and synthesize a number of disparate and
conflicting roles-literary critic, moral philosopher, religious author-
ity, structural engineer, political strategist; but it would be wrong to
abandon the ideal in the face of this challenge. The proper response
is increased effort, clarity of vision and determination, not surrender.
III.
The nihilism that I have addressed is based on the premise that
for any text there are any number of possible meanings and the inter-
preter creates a meaning by choosing one. I have accepted this
premise, but have tried to deny the nihilism by showing why the
freedom is not absolute. I have argued that legal interpretations are
constrained by rules that derive their authority from an interpretive
community that is itself held together by the commitment to the rule
of law. There may, however, be a deeper nihilism that I have not yet
addressed, and that also seems part of the present moment in Ameri-
can intellectual life.
For the deconstructionist, it makes little difference whether a text
is viewed as holding all meanings or no meaning: Either brand of
nihilism liberates the critic as meaning-creator. My defense of adju-
dication as objective interpretation, however, assumes that the Con-
36. &e Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896).
37. &e Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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stitution has some meaning-more specifically, that the text
embodies the fundamental public values of our society. I have con-
fronted the nihilism that claims the Constitution means everything;
but my defense does not work if the alternative version of the literary
nihilism is embraced and applied to the law. My defense does not
work if it is said that the Constitution has no meaning, for there is no
theory of legitimacy that would allow judges to interpret texts that
themselves mean nothing. The idea of adjudication requires that
there exist constitutional values to interpret, just as much as it re-
quires that there be constraints on the interpretive process. Lacking
such a belief, adjudication is not possible, only power.
The roots of this alternative version of nihilism are not clear to
me, but its significance is unmistakable. The great public text of
modem America, the Constitution, would be drained of meaning. It
would be debased. It would no longer be seen as embodying a public
morality to be understood and expressed through rational processes
like adjudication; it would be reduced to a mere instrument of polit-
ical organization--distributing political power and establishing the
modes by which that power will be exercised. Public values would
be defined only as those held by the current winners in the processes
prescribed by the Constitution; beyond that, there would be only in-
dividual morality, or even worse, only individual interests.
Against the nihilism that scoffs at the idea that the Constitution
has any meaning, it is difficult to reason. The issue seems to be one
of faith, intuition, or maybe just insight. This form of nihilism seems
so thoroughly at odds with the most elemental reading of the text
itself and with almost 200 years of constitutional history as to lead
me to wonder whether anything can be said in response. On the
other hand, I believe it imperative to respond, in word and in deed,
for this nihilism calls into question the very point of constitutional
adjudication; it threatens our social existence and the nature of pub-
lic life as we know it in America; and it demeans our lives. It is the
deepest and darkest of all nihilisms. It must be combated and can
be, though perhaps only by affirming the truth of that which is being
denied-the idea that the Constitution embodies a public morality
and that a public life founded on that morality can be rich and
inspiring.
April 1982]
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